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Biotechnology and the Legal
Constitution of the Self: Managing
Identity in Science, the Market, and
Society
by
JONATHAN KAHN*
"somebody almost walked off wid alla my stuff
not my poems or a dance i gave up in the street
but somebody almost walked off wid alla my stuff
like a kleptomaniac workin hard & forgetting while stealing
this is mine/this aint yr stuffl"
-Ntozake Shange.1
In 1990, the California Supreme Court decided that John Moore
did not own his spleen, or more specifically, he had no property rights
in the valuable pharmaceutical products that medical professionals
had derived from Moore's spleen cells after they had been removed
as part of his treatment for leukemia.2 In doing so, the Supreme
Court overturned that part of a lower court ruling finding that Moore
had a cause of action under the tort of "appropriation of identity"
based on the commodification of an aspect of his body, his DNA, that
was so intimately bound up with his identity as to be analogous to his
name or image.3 Since the court's decision, this remarkable case has
produced almost as much legal commentary4 as it has profits for the
* J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, 1988; Ph.D. (History), Cornell University, 1992.
Visiting Associate Professor in Social Studies, Harvard University.
1. NTOZAKE SHANGE, FOR COLORED GIRLS WHO HAVE CONSIDERED SUICIDE
WHEN THE RAINBOW IS ENUF 49 (1977).
2. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990),
reh'g denied.
3. See id. at 488-90.
4. A representative sample of some of the most useful writing includes the following:
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
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victorious defendants. Legal scholars, beginning with the writings of
the court itself, evidence a great sense of unease in dealing with the
unsettling and novel issues presented by Moore's case. The
commentary has overwhelmingly focused on issues relating to
property rights in the body and, to a lesser extent, informed consent.
Some argue straightforwardly about the commercial interests
involved. Others show more concern for the dignitary interests
implicated by the sale of body parts. The commentators generally
have found the various opinions (Supreme Court, Appellate Court;
majority, dissents, concurrences) somehow wanting. (This, of course,
is what legal commentators do.) But more is at stake here than basic
reflection upon apparently flawed court opinions. As the law enters
the arena of biotechnology (and other similar emerging technologies)
where control of commercially valuable information increasingly
implicates personal identity, existing principles of property law and
informed consent are simply inadequate to the task of dealing with
the resulting legal issues in a complete and satisfying manner.
I am therefore revisiting the case of Moore v. Regents of the
University of California to explore and elaborate an approach that, I
believe, points toward a more effective and just manner of ordering
the legal management of identity in the realm of biotechnology-and
perhaps beyond. The numerous articles, notes, and books on Moore
have largely overlooked the issues raised by the Appellate Court's
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996) (especially chapter 9); JOHN FROW, TIME AND
COMMODITY CULTURE 154-62 (1997); E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996) (especially
Chapter 2); ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW, chs. 3 & 5 (1997); Helen Bergman, Case
Comment, Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 127
(1992); Michelle Bourianoff, Note, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right in
Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990); Mary Taylor Danforth, Cells, Sales and
Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 179
(1988); Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal
Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1331 (1996); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights"
Picture of Property, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 711 (1996); Laura Ivey, Note, Moore v. Regents
of the University of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients' Rights in the
Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REv. 489 (1991); Jennifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of
Human Tissue: Life after Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 75 VA. L.
REv. 1363 (1989); Stephen Mortinger, Comment, Spleen For Sale: Moore v. Regents of
the University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499
(1990); Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Expanded Disclosure,
Limited Property Rights, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1992). Among the few commentaries by
a non-legal scholar is an intriguing essay by Paul Rabinow, Severing the Ties:
Fragmentation and Dignity in Late Modernity, 9 KNOWLEDGE & SOC'Y 169 (1992). Jane
Gaines also has a brief but illuminating discussion of the case in New Direction: The
Absurdity of Property in the Person, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 537 (1998).
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use of the privacy-based tort of appropriation of identity to resolve
the case.5 This is understandable, perhaps, given the Supreme Court's
own brusque dismissal of the issue as largely irrelevant, not to
mention the plaintiff's own omission of such a claim from his
complaint. Nonetheless, I believe that a return to this tort in
particular, and principles of privacy-based jurisprudence more
broadly, may open up new and significant areas of analysis and
understanding regarding the legal recognition and management of
identity.
This article will pursue three such areas and consider how certain
ideas underlying the tort of appropriation may enable us more
effectively to deal with the problems presented by a case such as
Moore's. First, I will explore how the tort of appropriation of identity
opens up new approaches to inform and perhaps supplement
principles of property law as a guide to managing genetic information
or other materials that seem intimately bound up with a particular
human subject. That is, intellectual property, which provided the
foundation for legitimating the patents to products derived from
Moore's cells, is a legal regime for the management of information.
Appropriation of identity is also, at root, a privacy-based legal regime
for the management of information-in this case, information
regarded as intimately bound up with a subject's identity. I believe
that the result in Moore v. Regents is ultimately is such an unsatisfying
and provocative commentary because the regime of intellectual
property law is inadequate to meet many of the challenges posed by
emerging technologies. New principles may yet be elaborated, but in
the meantime I believe the Appellate Court, by invoking the tort of
appropriation, perhaps unwittingly hit upon a potentially rich source
of existing law that may be used to inform and guide the legal
management of certain critical types of information produced or
manipulated by new technologies.
Second, I will analyze how the various opinions produced by the
5. In his discussion of the right of publicity and its relation to property rights in the
body, E. Richard Gold alludes to "reintegrating the right of privacy" into publicity cases.
But he reduces the right to privacy as protection for "hurt feelings, such as embarrassment
and humiliation." In so doing, he both trivializes dignitary interests (as do many courts)
and reduces them solely to a function of individual concern. See GOLD, supra note 4, at
103-06. As the history of the tort of appropriation shows, privacy rights originated in a
concern to protect the integrity of the very identity of an individual, as well as of a
particular type of community sufficient to recognize and respect such dignitary interests.
See generally, Jonathan Kahn, Enslaving the Image: The Origins of the Tort of
Appropriation of Identity Reconsidered, 2 LEGAL THEORY 301 (1996) [hereinafter
"Enslaving the Image"].
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Supreme Court (majority, concurrence, and dissent) implicitly
elaborate a powerful and problematic relation between the spheres of
private life, science and the market, such that the science is granted
special status and power relative to the other two-or rather, how the
Supreme Court effectively exploits the social status of science to
expand the reach of the market into the private sphere of control over
the body. This section will also consider how appealing to science to
define the "identity" of Moore's cells, effectively displaces the ability
of non-expert communities to define and assert local norms regarding
the status of individual identity vis a vis the market.
Finally, I consider how the Appellate Court's discussion of
appropriation of identity suggests possible new avenues to pursue
regarding the legal recognition and management of both individual
and group identity. Specifically, the court made the intriguing and
potentially radical move of extending principles of appropriation to
Moore's DNA as constitutive of his identity. A fuller analysis of
Moore's case suggests that, just as DNA may be recognized under
principles of appropriation as constitutive of one's identity, so too
might the law accord a measure of recognition to other significant
affiliations -such as race, class, gender, religion, or ethnicity-as
fundamentally constitutive of one's individual identity. By focusing
on identity-constitutive affiliations, the concept of appropriation may
shift the legal debate from one over "group rights" to one of "rights
through groups"-that is, to consider how legal treatment of groups
through which individuals derive, construct, and/or maintain
significant aspects of their identity implicates individual rights.
This approach to the legal status of group affiliation challenges
traditional liberal understandings of the boundaries of the self. It
may also present a powerful new alternative or supplement to existing
equal protection doctrine. Given persistent injustices resulting from
identity-based affiliations, scholars and practitioners concerned with
the legal construction of identity typically look at how the law
discriminates against groups based on race, gender, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, or nationality. That is, they use principles of
equal protection to analyze the law in relation to "racial" identity,
"gender" identity, and so forth. They do not, however, generally
consider how the law may construct or manage "identity" itself
because the relational stance of equality does not require a definition
of identity. Those concerned with equality focus on how the law
treats people based on their identity, not on identity itself.6 Of
6. Feminist legal analysis has provided very insightful critiques of the concept of
equal protection under the law. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
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course, the law is always shaping identity in one way or another. But
in the jurisprudence of appropriation we see the courts explicitly
engaging with problems of recognizing and managing identity in a
manner both highly revealing and suggestive of broader possibilities
for dealing with group rights in contemporary society. Here my
discussion itself will be more suggestive than conclusive as it raises an
array of issues that are beyond the immediate scope of this article.
My overall approach is informed by the relatively
straightforward observation that intellectual property and privacy are
both regimes developed in large part for the legal management of
information. The extensive commentary on Moore's case points up
the fact that each alone seems inadequate to the task of managing
new forms of information that are being generated or manipulated by
emerging technologies. Together, however, they may provide a basis
for a more satisfactory resolution to cases such as Moore's-cases
that are likely to proliferate as our technologies continue to develop.
I. The Case: Moore v. Regents of the University of California
John Moore was, among other things, a medical patient whose
spleen cells were taken from him and used to produce valuable
pharmaceutical products without his knowledge or explicit consent.7
Moore suffered from a condition known as hairy cell leukemia. In
October 1976, he traveled from his home in Washington State to the
Medical Center at the University of California, Los Angeles to seek
treatment. At the Medical Center, Dr. David Golde confirmed the
diagnosis and removed part of Moore's spleen as a necessary part of
the treatment. Upon studying the spleen and other blood products
and bodily fluids taken from Moore, his doctors became aware that
Moore's cells had distinctive properties that were of potentially great
commercial value as sources of pharmaceutical products. The doctors
encouraged Moore to make regular visits back to the Medical Center
for monitoring and continued treatment. During these visits, doctors
extracted additional body fluids for research purposes. Moore gave
consent to the extraction of these fluids, but he was never told
anything about the ongoing work to develop commercially valuable
products from his genetic material. By 1979, Dr. Golde, together with
UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982); Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987); and DEBORAH L.
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989).
7. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (Ct.
App. 1988), review granted and superceded by 763 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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UCLA researcher Shirley Quan, had established a cell line from
Moore's T-lymphocytes, a type of white blood cell that can produce
materials having potential therapeutic value. Establishing a "cell
line" is of great scientific and commercial value because it creates a
culture capable of reproducing itself indefinitely. On January 30,
1981 the Regents of the University of California applied for a patent
on the cell line. In his complaint, Moore admitted the difficulty of
fixing an exact commercial value on the cell line, but noted that the
biotechnology industry's predicted a potential market of more than $3
billion for such products.8
Moore cast his claim as a straightforward property-based right to
share in the profits derived from the use of his cells. He did not
explicitly argue that his body parts constituted a "name or likeness"
per se that were appropriated in violation of his right to privacy.
Rather, he alleged "conversion" of his personal property-his cells
and other bodily materials taken for the research and production of
commercially valuable pharmaceuticals. Nonetheless, in a striking
opinion, the California Court of Appeals for the Second District,
analogized Moore's situation to cases involving appropriation of
identity, holding that, if the jurisprudence of appropriation protected
the individual's interest in projections of identity in name or image, it
also could and should be applied to protect constituent components
of his identity-in this case, DNA.9
The California Supreme Court upheld that part of Moore's claim
based on breach of fiduciary duty and informed consent, but it
ultimately rejected the lower court's finding with respect to
conversion and its attendant analogy to appropriation in a
perfunctory manner that did not fully address the arguments and
issues the lower court raised. The Appellate Court's opinion found
support in strong dissenting opinions by Justices Mosk and Broussard
(dissenting in part) and to a lesser degree in an interesting
concurrence by Justice Arabian. In any event, the Appellate Court's
reasoning is provocative and the logic of its argument potentially far
reaching. Whether or not it is currently good law, the lower court's
argument regarding the appropriation deserves fuller consideration
than that given by the majority of the California Supreme Court. This
appropriation analysis opens up new areas to explore as we begin to
consider how the legal recognition of identity as elaborated in the
jurisprudence of appropriation may potentially be extended into new
areas of the law and social life.
8. See 793 P.2d at 480-82.
9. See 249 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08.
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H. The Tort: Appropriation of Identity0
Since the turn of the last century, the American legal system has
recognized a person's "identity" as something that could be stolen, or
"appropriated" (not racial identity, or gender identity but simply
identity). Grounded in the common law right to privacy, the tort of
"appropriation of identity" involves the use, without consent, of
another's name or likeness for commercial gain.12 The tort was first
recognized by a state court in the case of Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., an early and influential privacy case wherein the
Supreme Court of Georgia stated that "the publication of one's
picture without his consent by another as an advertisement, for the
mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is
an invasion of [the right to privacy]."' 3 In 1903, Paolo Pavesich had
sued the New England Life Insurance Company over the
unauthorized publication of his picture in an advertisement for life
insurance together with a caption falsely attributing an endorsement
of the product to him. In finding for Pavesich, the court singled out
the commercial nature of the use as especially important. First, the
court addressed free speech concerns by minimizing the expressive
value of the advertisement, holding that such use contained "not the
slightest semblance of an expression of an idea, thought, or an
opinion, within the meaning of the constitutional provision which
guarantees a person the right to publish his sentiments on any
10. Much of the discussion in the section draws on my article, Enslaving the Image,
supra note 5.
11. In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis for the first time fully elaborated the
principle of privacy as a right deserving of legal recognition and protection in a now
legendary article published in the Harvard Law Review. Warren and Brandeis reviewed
the diverse strands of legal, political and social commentary relating to issues of privacy
and wove them together into a coherent argument for a legally distinct right to privacy
grounded in a concern for "man's spiritual nature." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter "The Right to
Privacy"]. To Warren and Brandeis, privacy did not involve property so much as the
"more general right to the immunity of the person-the right to one's personality." Id. at
205. Their project was largely to "disentangle privacy from property," Robert C. Post,
Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 648 (1991), and their great accomplishment was to articulate privacy as a free
standing basic right. See David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual
History of Tort Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 769, 779-80 (1991). For a thorough review
of the right to privacy in the nineteenth century, see Note, The Right to Privacy in
Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1892 (1981).
12. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 389 (1960).
13. 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905).
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subject. '14 Second, it asserted that the advertisement had harmed
Pavesich by depriving him of control over his identity, in effect,
"enslaving" him by forcing his image into the service of another
against his will.15
The court in Pavesich carried the notion-that aspects of the self
could become embodied in representations of the self-to its logical
extreme in analogizing appropriation of identity to slavery. In
powerful and evocative language, the court detailed the outrage:
The knowledge that one's features and form are being used for
such a purpose, and displayed in such places as advertisements are
often liable to be found, brings not only the person of an extremely
sensitive nature, but even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a
realization that his liberty has been taken away from him; and, as
long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot be
otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being,
under the control of another, that he is no longer free, and that he
is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to service by a
merciless master; and if a man of true instincts, or even ordinary
sensibilities, no one can be more conscious of his enthrallment than
he is.16
In a remarkable semiotic turn, the court in Pavesich seems to have
said that to enslave a representation of a person was to enslave the
person himself. He who owns your sign, owns you.
The court thus recognized a special connection between a person
and his image. Such a connection was essential to the idea that one
could actually appropriate a person's "identity" through seizing his
picture. The court assumed that Pavesich was literally invested in his
name and likeness in a way that distinguished the tort of
appropriation from the theft of a simple piece of property. The court,
indeed, was little concerned with the material value of his image.
Rather, it perceived that his image contained an intangible part of his
self, of his spirit or identity; so much so, that the wrongful use of his
image effectively enslaved a part of Pavesich.17
14. Id. at 80.
15. Id
16. Id.
17. As property, Pavesich's name and image were essentially intangible. The court's
recognizing them as belonging to Pavesich reflects what Kenneth Vandevelde has
identified as the "dephysicalization of property," a jurisprudential evolution that occurred
in late nineteenth and early twentieth century American law. Vandevelde argues that a
new "relational" conception of property as a "valuable interest" rather than as a physical
thing emerged during this period. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L.
REV. 325, 328-330 (1980). This phenomenon perhaps also accounts for the irony of a
Southern court, merely nine years after Plessy v. Ferguson, speaking so passionately about
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That the law recognizes so amorphous a concept as "identity" is
in itself remarkable. But even more remarkable is the degree to
which scholars and practitioners of "identity politics" have
overlooked its place in the history of the development of American
law. Perhaps the relative obscurity of the tort of appropriation is due
to its being eclipsed by its flashier cousin: the right of publicity. The
right of publicity involves a person's (usually a celebrity's) right to
control the marketing of her name or image. Publicity is a property
right involving the individual's interest in the commercial value of her
image. Damages in such cases compensate the plaintiff for economic
loss.18 The privacy-based tort of appropriation is quite different. It
involves a personal right, concerning the individual's interest in
maintaining the integrity of her identity. In appropriation cases,
damages compensate the plaintiff for dignitary harm. They may also
involve declarations that serve to vindicate or rehabilitate the
integrity of the plaintiff's identity. In defining the right of publicity,
the law deals with a person's image as a commodity. The identity of
the subject matters only insofar as it may be translated into a
quantifiable market value. But with the tort of appropriation,
identity is valued precisely as a distinctive marker of the subject's
unique individuality. Robert Post's work on the social foundations of
the related tort of defamation is useful in further elaborating the
distinction between dignitary and property interests. Post notes that
"dignity is not the result of individual achievement and its value
cannot be measured in the marketplace. It is, instead, 'essential' and
intrinsic in 'every human being." '19 Post similarly noted that "honor
cannot be converted into a continuous medium of exchange. It
cannot be bought and sold .... -20 Thus, while damages may be
sought in an appropriation case, the harm is measured not as a
function of market value or unjust enrichment, but as a basis for
vindicating and rehabilitating the subject's dignity. Indeed, the legal
the harms of "enslavement." 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Just as conceptions of property had
developed from physical to relational, so too does the court's reasoning reflect a
"dephysicalized" conception of slavery. One need not control the physical body of
another to enslave them. Rather, one need only enslave an object, such as a name or
image, bearing a special relation to that person.
18. See Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203
(1954); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1989).
19. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 702,712 (1986).
20. Id. at 712-13. For a fuller discussion of the relation between appropriation of
identity and publicity rights, see generally Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light:
Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213 (1999).
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domain of privacy provides such a useful complement to property law
in examining cases such as Moore's precisely because it generally
stands outside of, and often in opposition to, the domain of the
market.
A. Identity Interests and Body Interests
At Moore's initial trial, the Superior Court dismissed the case,
sustaining demurrers by the defendants. The Appellate Court
reversed, holding that the plaintiff, Moore, had adequately stated a
cause of action for conversion.21 The defendants had asserted that the
DNA from Moore's cells was "not a part of him over which he [had]
the ultimate power of disposition during his life ... -"22 The
Appellate Court found this argument "untenable" and drew upon
appropriation of identity cases to assert that DNA, as a constituent of
individual identity, deserved the same legal recognition as names or
images that were manifestations of identity. The court concluded
that, "a patient must have the ultimate power to control what
becomes of his or her tissues. To hold otherwise would open the door
to a massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in the name of
medical progress." 23
Overall, the court evidenced a somewhat confused reading of
appropriation. It asserted that appropriation cases establish a
"proprietary interest" in one's persona, completely overlooking the
dignitary aspects of the tort throughout its history. Yet, the court
went on to characterize the harm to Moore as "a massive invasion of
human privacy and dignity," implicitly recognizing that these values
too lie at the heart of appropriation of identity. The confusion arose,
perhaps, because the court wanted to consider the dignitary aspects of
the harm to Moore, but Moore himself apparently was concerned
primarily about money. He did not assert a dignitary harm nor was
he seeking to redress any emotional injury. Rather, he alleged
conversion: the wrongful exercise of dominion over his personal
property by the defendants in a manner inconsistent with his title or
rights therein.24 That is, he wanted a piece of the action that had been
generated from a piece of himself-the profits of the commercial
biotechnology enterprise that had its source in what were, after all,
originally his cells.
The Appellate Court, however, was very concerned with dignity.
21. See 249 Cal. Rptr. at 507-508.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 508.
24. See id. at 503.
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The commercialization of human body parts unsettled the court and
led it to examine deeper political and ethical issues implicated by
Moore's claim.25 The court began by considering the disturbing
implications of treating the tissue of a living person as a form of
tangible personal property. It began historically, noting that "the
evolution of civilization from slavery to freedom, from regarding
people as chattels to recognition of the individual dignity of each
person, necessitates prudence in attributing the qualities of property
to human tissue. '2 6 The parallels with early writings on the right to
privacy are striking. Like Warren and Brandeis in their original 1890
article on the right to privacy, and like Roscoe Pound in his 1915
article on the "Interests of Personality," the Moore court began its
analysis with a story of mankind's progress from savagery to
civilization. For Warren and Brandeis the right to privacy grew out of
civilization's growing awareness of and consideration for "man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect." 27 Pound saw the
emergence of legal recognition of the "interests of personality" as
resulting from "the progress of society" and "increasing
civilization." 28 The Moore court's whiggish history of teleological
evolution similarly marks the legal recognition of intangible interests
in individual dignity as an incident of social progress. Its allusion to
slavery, of course, evokes the language of Pavesich in expressing its
concern that appropriation of one's image effectively turned him into
a "slave, without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless
master." 29  Where the court in Pavesich was concerned about
enslavement caused by new technologies of photo-reproduction and
mass printing, the Appellate Court in Moore raised the specter of
possible enslavement caused by new bio-technologies that
"reproduced" aspects of Moore in new and different ways. In a world
where human cloning is being discussed in terms of "when" and not
"if," such issues must be of more than passing concern.
The court ultimately disposed of this problem by distinguishing
between one person being the property of another and Moore's claim
25. Thus, even using a privacy-based analysis we can see how Moore's claim of
conversion might fail because he did not allege any subjective sense of identity-based
dignitary harm. Nonetheless, the jurisprudence of appropriation can and should be
recognized and made available as a supplement to inform or guide principles of
intellectual property as a basis for managing information, such as DNA codes, that may be
intimately linked to a person's identity.
26. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
27. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 193.
28. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343,343 n.2 (1915).
29. 50 S.E. at 80.
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to have property fights "in one's own body. ' 30 This sounds quite
Lockean, but it also opens up the highly problematic possibility of
allowing one to alienate freely one's body parts. On the principle of
alienability, liberal theory generally draws the line at slavery. In a
liberal polity, an individual is not permitted to sell herself into slavery.
At one point, the court likens selling body parts to selling one's
labor,31 but it does not seem to consider fully some of the potential
problems this raises.
For example, James Boyle, exploring the implications of genetic
research both for property rights and for our conceptions of what
constitutes a human being, considers the possibility of what he terms
"transgenic slavery." Scientists create transgenic organisms by
combining the genetic material from two different species. Already
animals such as cows have been engineered to contain certain human
genetic material. Boyle raises the possibility of a human-chimp
hybrid, "Chimpy," able to perform important but potentially
dangerous work, without the inconvenience to employers of such
requirements as wages, unions or safe working conditions-i.e., the
equivalent of slavery. While such an eventuality is admittedly
unlikely, pursuing its implications may nonetheless lead to some
useful insights. Indeed, Boyle notes that the U.S. "Patent Office has
said that it will not grant patents on human beings because the
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits the ownership of one human being
by another." Pushing the scenario further, we must ask at what point
would an organism such as "Chimpy" become a human being, with
human rights? Boyle suggests that in the context of genetic
engineering, the "social understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment
might turn out to be a subset of the [First Commandment's]
prohibition of idolatry and graven images-a prohibition on making
beings in our own image. '32 To my ear, Boyle's concerns for
transgenic slavery resonate not only with God's First Commandment
to Moses, but also with the court's opinion in Pavesich. A genetic
engineer might make a full-blown corporeal "image" of a human
being in a lab; an advertiser might make a visual or aural image of a
subject with a camera or tape recorder. The former, I would argue, is
perceived by society as offensive because it demeans the dignity of
human beings as a whole. The offense is caused primarily by the
creation of such a being in the first place. The later possible
enslavement of such being further degrades not only the subject but
30. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
31. See id.
32. Boyle, supra note 4, at 150-51.
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the society which would enslave it.
With regard to Moore's situation, we might consider that while a
subject may not be directly selling himself into slavery through
alienating his DNA, he might be contributing to the creation of a
transgenic being that itself would later be enslaved. Moreover, one
might argue that a being created from a subject's DNA, whether
transgenic or through cloning, constitutes an "image" of that subject.
Under the jurisprudence of appropriation, the creation and use of
such an image could well constitute a deep harm to the dignity of the
subject.
A clearer focus on privacy-based identity interests would allow
us to move beyond the question of whether or to what extent certain
or all body parts can be commodified. The Appellate Court's
discussion of Moore's "proprietary interest" in his persona in tandem
with its analogy to appropriation vitiated the force and clarity of a
potentially innovative argument. The court's conflation or
confounding of privacy and proprietary interests opened the door to
the Supreme Court's easy dismissal of appropriation as an
"inappropriate" source of law. If we disentangle the two interests, it
may then be possible to use one to inform the other in a constructive
and legitimate manner.
The first step is to recognize that appropriation of identity does
not involve the use of one's body but rather of one's "name or image"
in a manner that implicates one's identity. Moore's "property right"
in his body is irrelevant to the tort. The Appellate Court essentially
found that a body part may be so construed as to manifest an aspect
of a person's identity. But it then made the mistake of characterizing
the resulting interest as proprietary, even as it invoked claims of
dignity. Appropriation does not harm the body per se, but rather
one's identity. Neither does it harm one's property, but rather, one's
dignity.
Alan Hyde's discussion of "narrated bodies" in his book, Bodies
of Law, is suggestive of further distinctions along these lines. In
analyzing the language from a well-known loss of consortium case
involving a severe injury to the husband, Hyde notes that "the
dominant literary trope" of the opinion is "narrative, typically
chronological." The husband's body "is not a machine, or property,
or commodity; it is not private, or sacred, or the 'physical and
temporal expression of the unique human persona' [citing Mosk's
dissent in Moore]." Such "narrated bodies," argues Hyde, seem more
direct and natural: "we find them when empathy is sought." He
continues by stating that, "the narrated body of [the husband] is a
powerful alternative to the body figured as property, commodity, or
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interest." 33
Identity is similarly a narrative concept. Anthony Giddens, for
example, provides a useful and succinct definition of what he terms
"self identity" as "the self as reflectively understood by the person in
terms of his or her biography. Identity here presumes continuity
across time and space: but self-identity is such continuity as
interpreted reflexively by the agent."34 The tort of appropriation may
thus similarly construct its subject narratively. Identities develop over
time. We come to value them and understand potential harm to them
largely through acts of empathy where we are asked to stand in the
place of the injured party to understand the mortification she may
have experienced at the "enslavement" of an aspect of her self. In a
case such as Moore's, such a stance might complement property-
based assessments of the commercial value of the information at
stake. It would allow for the option of articulating a non-commercial
basis for maintaining control over such information. Moreover, the
tort of appropriation allows for the vindication, not only of individual
rights, but of broader community values. The act of empathy
demanded of the court or the jury allows it to assert and maintain a
particular vision of their community as one that maintains social
relations sufficient to support an individual's ability to protect her
identity; that is, a community that values non-commercial, as well as
commercial, aspects of the individual. Such a community allows for a
legal distinction between the body and the self, recognizing that
certain uses of the former may implicate the latter in a manner
inconsistent with the character and values of the community.35
Second, it is necessary to isolate discussions of property-based
publicity rights and focus directly on issues of individual control over
the non-commercial identity interests implicated by the management
of genetic information. In a sense, the Supreme Court does this by
dismissing the Appellate Court's analogy to appropriation precisely
because it is a privacy tort, and the Supreme Court was concerned
only with the property interests involved (as, to be fair to the
Supreme Court, was Moore himself).3 6 Thus, we need to bring
privacy back into the discussion, not necessarily to supplant property
law but to supplement and inform our use of it. An explicit
33. Hyde, supra note 4, at 101-03.
34. ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN
THE LATE MODERN AGE 53 (1991).
35. For more on the relation between the tort of appropriation and community values,
see Kahn, supra note 5, at 318-24.
36. See 793 P.2d at 490.
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engagement with the law of privacy and appropriation would allow
courts to more coherently analyze the troubling issues of identity and
dignity which heretofore have been dealt with unconvincingly by
invoking property law and informed consent.37
Stanley Mosk's dissent from the Supreme Court's opinion begins
to move in this direction. For instance, Mosk considers the social
values implicated by Moore's claim when he asserts that,
our society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect
the human body as the physical and temporal expression of the
unique human persona. One manifestation of that respect is our
prohibition against direct abuse of the body by torture or other
forms of cruel or unusual punishment. Another is our prohibition
against indirect abuse of the body by its economic exploitation for
the sole benefit of another person. The most abhorrent form of
such exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery.38
Here Mosk exhibits a concern for a very different type of
uniqueness-that of the "human persona." Such uniqueness is not
tangible or quantifiable but rests in a traditionally liberal conception
of the value of each person as a distinct, rights-bearing individual
whose dignity must be respected and protected by the law. Like the
Appellate Court, Mosk's reference to slavery is evocative of the
language of Pavesich and the idea that, to the extent that an image or
name embodies an aspect of a person's identity, its appropriation
constitutes an effective enslavement of that person. Here, it is the
commercial exploitation of a constituent component of Moore's
"unique human persona" that Mosk juxtaposes with slavery.
Mosk elaborates on the nature of the particular harm done to
Moore's identity by quoting a law review article to make the point
37. Informed consent does implicate issues of dignity insofar as it is used to vindicate
autonomy in the form of an individual's right to make informed decisions concerning the
use of her body. See, e.g., Recent Development, Tort Law-Informed Consent, 104
HARV. L. REV. 808 (1991). But it would, for example, likely fail to deal adequately with a
situation such as Moore's (at least as it was initially) where the discovery of valuable
research uses arise only after the initial medical procedure. Informed consent deals
primarily with the dignity or autonomy of the speaker as implicated by the right to make
informed choices about important health matters-important to be sure-but
appropriation/privacy deals with a distinct dignitary interest relating directly to the control
of information or material that is intimately connected with the subjects identity or sense
of self. Moreover, informed consent applies only to situations where some sort of
fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant. It has no bearing on
situations where genetic or other intimate information has been obtained outside such a
relationship. Finally, the focus of informed consent is largely on the integrity of the
doctor-patient relationship, whereas the focus of appropriation is on the integrity of the
individual's identity.
38. 793 P.2d at 515.
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that
[research on human cells for economic gain] tends to treat the
human body as a commodity.... The dignity and sanctity with
which we regard the human whole, body as well as mind and soul,
are absent when we allow researchers to further their own interests
without the patient's participation by using the patient's cells as the
basis for a marketable product. 39
Commenting on Mosk's concern for the "human whole," Paul
Rabinow notes that "the question remains a holistic one: body, mind,
spirit and person are one; part is whole. '40  This conception
challenges the Cartesian dualism articulated by the lower court.
Indeed, from a holistic point of view, it is, perhaps, precisely the
fragmentation of Moore's self, the severing of a constitutive part of
his identity, that amounts to an affront to dignity. Drucilla Cornell
has argued that denying the right to an abortion undermines the
integrity of the female body by fragmenting its wholeness. 41 Mosk
here exhibits a similar concern that commodifying the human body
might similarly undermine the "dignity and sanctity of the human
whole." The fact that the object at issue (the cell line created from
Moore's excised cells) is actually beyond Moore's body does not
lessen Mosk's concern that its commodification may degrade Moore's
dignity and efface the distinctive individuality of his identity. Thus, as
in the jurisprudence of appropriation, Mosk assumes a connection
between the corporeal body and objects beyond its formal
boundaries. That the cells were once part of Moore's body does not
seem to distinguish this situation significantly from one involving a
name or image because, as Mosk and the lower court take pains to
point out, the cells are different from other objects that were once
part of Moore's body, such as fecal material. The cells are not mere
waste; rather, they are perceived to embody and constitute aspects of
Moore's identity. The relationship between the object and the
subject's identity then is what matters, not the simple relation to the
subject's corporeal body.
B. Science Transcendent, The Market Supreme
In its opinion, the Appellate Court noted that "[u]ntil recently,
39. Id. at 516 (quoting Mary Taylor Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's
Rights to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 179,190 (1988)).
40. Paul Rabinow, Severing the Ties: Fragmentation and Dignity in Late Modernity, 9
KNOWLEDGE & Soc'Y 169, 182 (1992).
41. Drucilla Cornell, Bodily Integrity and the Right to Abortion, in IDENTITIES,
POLITICS, AND RIGHTS: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 21, 36
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
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the physical human body, as distinguished from the mental and
spiritual, was believed to have little value, other than as a source of
labor. In recent history, we have seen the human body assume
astonishing aspects of value." 42 The court thus framed its argument in
terms of a straightforward Cartesian separation of the mind and body.
This logic set up the court's later finding that Moore had a property
right in his body parts, but it also contains the germ of the Supreme
Court's later reversal with respect to the claim of conversion. The
tort of appropriation of identity is based precisely on establishing a
connection between the spiritual nature of an individual and a
particular material (or corporeal) object. A claim of appropriation
exists to the extent that the court finds aspects of the self to be
invested in such an object. By presenting Moore's body as wholly
separate from his spirit, the Appellate Court provided no grounds for
a perspective that would view the use of his body as harmful to the
integrity of his identity. Within the court's Cartesian framework,
there was no injury to Moore's "self."
Indeed, this was, more or less, the tack taken by the Appellate
dissent, which argued that the defendants had "transmuted" Moore's
worthless spleen "from human waste into patentable blood cell
lines. '43 The dissent went on to assert that, "although the raw
material from plaintiff's body may have been unique, it evolved into
something of great value only through the unusual scientific expertise
of defendants, like unformed clay or stone transformed by the hands
of a master sculptor into a valuable work of art."44 The reference to
clay immediately calls to mind Boyle's concerns about manufacturing
transgenic beings in our image-as God formed Adam out of clay.
Beyond this, Boyle also comments directly on Moore's case. He
notes that the dissent's argument, ultimately taken up by the majority
of the Supreme Court on appeal, is grounded in a conception of
Moore's body as a source of raw materials that are transformed by
scientists and doctors into something new and valuable. Analogizing
the situation to intellectual property law, Boyle sees the opinion
guided by a notion of "romantic authorship" which valorizes the
creative expression of gifted individuals who give "new ideas to the
society at large and [are] granted in return a limited right of private
property in the artifact [they] have created. '45 The dissent can make
this move without resistance because the majority has already
42. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
43. Id. at 537.
44. Id.
45. BOYLE, supra note 4, at xii, 56-57, 104-08.
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conceded a disjunction between Moore's DNA and his spirit.
The court's characterization of genetic material as "something
far more profoundly the essence of one's human uniqueness than a
name or a face, '46 is also problematic. The idea that DNA is what
makes a person unique supplants the more humanistic concern for
man's spirit or dignity articulated in earlier appropriation cases with a
highly scientized notion of individuality. That is, the Appellate Court
here casts the damage to Moore's uniqueness not in terms of
vernacular understandings of individuality but by reference to
scientific evidence that establishes DNA as the basis of physical
uniqueness. Yet, the court does ultimately conceive of the harm to
Moore as a "massive invasion of human privacy and dignity."47 This
again reflects the court's confusion between the proprietary and
dignitary aspects of identity that are implicated by Moore's claims.
In its discussion of his genetic uniqueness, the Appellate Court
implied a direct connection between genes and identity. Its mention
of fingerprints and blood type, not to mention personality traits,
indicates a concern for those attributes that mark each individual as
unique. But, of course, all humans have blood, and all have
fingerprints. The fact that one has a fingerprint does not mark one as
unique. It is the relationship between a particular individual and their
distinctive genetic make-up that establishes uniqueness. That is, all
human beings have DNA. Therefore, DNA marks one human as
distinct from another only insofar as a relationship can be established
between a specific individual and his particular genetic code 8
46. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
47. Id.
48. As Paul Rabinow comments in his discussion of dignity in relation to the creation
of an "immortal" cell line from Moore's tissue:
Philosophically, the whole kind is preserved in the individual. The species and
the individual coincided; the species immortal and the individual mortal....
Dignitas was at first an attribute of the King: the King is dead, long live the King.
Then the term migrated to the medieval corporation. Dignitas became
generalized and was given a precise legal status as a Phoenix-like attribute in
which the corporation coincided with the individual precisely because it
reproduced no more than one individuation at a time, the incumbent-the
Corporate Sole. In this sense, Moore's body was inviolable and unique, even in
its immortalized state, simultaneously the same and different. In fact, Mosk
seems to hold precisely this view when he asserts that Moore's cells and his cell
line are identical even though the cell line has a different number of
chromosomes and exists only under laboratory conditions.
Rabinow, supra note 40, 182-83. Moore was the same as every other human being in that
he had DNA, and yet different, in that he had a distinctive genetic code. Similarly, we
may argue that all human beings are their possession of dignity, as an attribute inherent to
our social definition of a person, and yet distinct insofar a key component of dignity is
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Similarly, it is the relationship between an individual and a particular
image that establishes whether her identity is bound up in the image.
The court's opinion overlooks this relational aspect of identity, simply
asserting the material basis of identity in DNA. The Appellate
Court's failure to consider the relational aspect of identity and its
confusion of the proprietary and personal aspects of the interest at
stake left its opinion vulnerable to precisely the sort of
reinterpretation of scientific evidence that formed a large part of the
California Supreme Court's later reversal on this matter.
In dismissing Moore's claim of conversion, the California
Supreme Court first rejected the lower court's analogy to the law of
appropriation as "irrelevant to the issue of conversion" because the
cases it cited did not expressly base their holdings on property law.49
This is basically all the court had to say on the matter-appropriation
dealt with privacy, not property; therefore, its principles were
inapposite to Moore's specific case. Of course, since its inception, the
tort of appropriation has been bound up with its companion, the right
of publicity.50 Individual cases inevitably seem to implicate both
privacy and property rights. The problem here is that Moore himself
invoked only his proprietary rights to his genetic material. The
Appellate Court, perhaps, would have had a stronger argument if,
instead of using analogy to import the principles of appropriation into
Moore's claim of conversion, it had simply stated that the facts would
give rise to an outright claim of appropriation based on the degree to
which Moore's identity could be said to be bound up with his genetic
material.
Justice Broussard, in his dissent with respect to the issue of
conversion, criticized the majority's timidity, noting that if Moore
could provide no judicial decision to support his claim, neither could
the defendants provide any reported judicial decision to reject it. The
case, he concludes, was simply one of "first impression. '51
Broussard's criticism brings to mind similar criticisms, made nearly
ninety years before of New York's highest court for its decision in
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.52 In that 1902 case, the New
York Court of Appeals refused to recognize the plaintiff's claim that
her right to privacy had been infringed by the defendant's use of her
maintaining one's individual uniqueness. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and
Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTrTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND
AMERICAN VALUES 210 (Michael J. Meyer & W. A. Parent eds., 1992).
49. 793 P.2d at 490.
50. See generally Kahn, supra note 19.
51. See 793 P.2d at 502.
52. See 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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image together with the caption "flour of the family" to sell its flour
products. As in Moore, this was essentially a case of first impression
wherein the majority refused to find a right to privacy. Among the
court's concerns was the fear that establishing a right to privacy would
lead to a flood of litigation.53 Popular outrage at the decision led New
York in the following year to the passage of the first statute explicitly
recognizing the right to privacy.54 In his concurrence in Moore,
Justice Arabian echoed the Roberson court when he expressed
concern that recognizing Moore's claim for conversion might
"expos[e] researchers to potentially limitless and uncharted tort
liability."55
The Supreme Court, however, did not stop with its dismissal of
the lower court's analogy to appropriation. It went on to assert that
the lower court's use of the analogy to appropriation "seriously
misconceives the nature of the genetic material and research involved
in this case. ' 56 That is, the Supreme Court exploited the lower court's
reliance on scientific evidence to recast the nature of the interest at
stake. "The goal of the defendants' efforts," the Supreme Court
stated,
has been to manufacture lymphokines. Lymphokines, unlike a
name or a face, have the same molecular structure... in every
human being and the same, important functions in every human
being's immune system. Moreover, the particular genetic material
which is responsible for the natural production of lymphokines, and
which defendants use to manufacture lymphokines in the
laboratory, is also the same in every person; it is no more unique to
Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical
formula of hemoglobin.57
James Boyle comments that "this passage is remarkable partly
because it is nonsensical. It was precisely the unique properties of
Moore's genetic 'programs'... which made his tissue and bodily
fluids such an important part of Dr. David Golde's profitable
research. '58 True, the court's statement seems odd at best, but it was
able to make such a statement, in part, because of the lower court's
own confusion over the interest at stake. By characterizing Moore's
53. See id. at 443.
54. Laws of New York, 1903 N.Y. Laws 132. The constitutionality of the law was
upheld by the Court of Appeals in Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co, 85 N.E. 1097 (N.Y.
1908), aftd, 220 U.S. 502 (1908).
55. 793 P.2d at 498.
56. Id. at 490.
57. Id. at 490.
58. BOYLE, supra note 4, at 104.
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uniqueness primarily in terms of his physical attributes and genetic
material, the lower court left the door open to the Supreme Court's
reasoning.
Appropriation is based on a relation between self and image
through which one's identity becomes invested in an object beyond
the self. This relation is socially constructed and validated by
community recognition. The Supreme Court did not have to deal
with such intangibles because the lower court did not bring them to
the center of its argument. Hence, it could reach its rather startling
conclusion that there was nothing unique about Moore's genetic
material because "science" established that lymphokines "have the
same molecular structure in every human being."59 Had the lower
court based its argument more firmly on community standards that
defined and protected an individual's dignity as a human being, the
Supreme Court, perhaps, would have had a tougher time rejecting its
holding. As it was, the Supreme Court comfortably asserted that it
was not necessary "to force the round pegs of 'privacy' and 'dignity'
into the square hole of 'property' in order to protect the patient, since
the fiduciary duty and informed-consent theories protect these
interests directly by requiring full disclosure. '60 Interestingly, the
court did not say that there was no dignitary harm to Moore, merely
that his property-based complaint did not encompass such harm.
Finally, the majority supported its argument by asserting, in
effect, that Moore's cells, once severed from his body, were no longer
a part of his self. "The patented cell line," it asserted, "is both
factually and legally distinct... from Moore's body. '61 The court
focuses on the intervening "human ingenuity" and "inventive effort"
of the scientists in crafting a cells line as the basis for granting them a
patent.62 In an interesting footnote, however, the court also stated
that "[t]he distinction between primary cells (cells taken directly from
the body) and patented cell lines is not purely a legal one. Cells
change while being developed into a cell line and continue to change
over time [e.g., they may acquire an abnormal number of
chromosomes]. ' 63 In addition to the intervening creative effort of
scientists, which the opinion casts as transforming otherwise worthless
raw materials into a valuable and original product, the court also
apparently saw a temporal disjunction between Moore and the
59. 793 P.2d at 490.
60. Id at 491.
61. Id. at 492.
62. See id at 492-93.
63. Id. at 492 n.35.
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patented cells line that somehow fractured the connection between
his identity and his genetic material. The court's focus on the idea
that cells change over time indicates its belief that time changes not
only the material characteristics of a cell but also its "identity," that is,
its connection to its original source in Moore. It also attempts to
naturalize the difference; that is, to construct the disjunction between
Moore and his cells as a pre-political function of the "objective"
forces of nature.
One basic problem with this line of argument, of course, is that
cells change within the human body as well and yet remain recognized
by society as part of the person. Another problem is the court's
insistence that the separation of an object from one's corporeal body
somehow severs all ties to the subject's identity. This is where the
jurisprudence of appropriation bears directly and immediately on the
issues raised by Moore's case. Just as the law recognizes that a part of
a person's identity may become bound up with an object or phrase
that is external to their corporeal body, so too did the Appellate
Court in Moore recognize that an individual's identity might be
bound up with or affected by the use of genetic material which,
though external to the body, was historically intimately bound up with
the constitution of the subject's identity.
In an intriguing, if muddled, concurrence, Justice Arabian takes a
very different tack from that of the majority. He argues that Moore's
claim for conversion should be denied precisely because it offends
human dignity to allow an individual to profit from the sale of body
parts. Arabian is especially concerned about the potential entry of
profit motives and market forces into this arena. He is deeply
offended by Moore's claim, asserting that "[h]e entreats us to regard
the human vessel- the single most venerated and protected subject in
any civilized society-as equal with the basest commercial
commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane.
He asks much."64 Arabian, however, adopts a hands-off approach to
the problem that ultimately results in protecting the defendants' use
of Moore's tissue. He asks whether it would "advance or impede the
human condition spiritually or scientifically, by delivering the majestic
force of the law behind plaintiff's claim? I do not know the answers
to these troubling questions-nor am I willing.., to treat them
simply as issues of 'tort' law, susceptible of judicial resolution. '65
In his analysis of Moore, Alan Hyde comments on Arabian's
"cloddish and awkward" invocation of the "sacred body," which
64. Id. at 497 (Arabian, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 498.
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Hyde asserts is "the body that cannot be property, '66 but rather is a
"master symbol of what is not a subject of contract or barter." He
rightly notes that if Arabian took his invocation of the sacred body
seriously, he would find it to "prohibit ownership to Moore's cell line
by the defendant researchers." 67 Hyde concludes that "[t]he Moore
case well illustrates the impoverished nature of our legal discourse
about the body.... Moore's spleen is and is not his property; calling
it property makes Moore autonomous and degrades him. '68
Hyde insightfully deconstructs the legal discourse surrounding
the body here. One advantage of the tort of appropriation is that, by
focusing on identity, it situates legal analysis in a different discursive
realm. To be sure, social constructions of identity are no less
problematic than those of the body. But they are not, as Hyde might
say, as "naturalized" -that is, our social and historical understanding
of identity itself is more open to contested or negotiated meanings.
The body may or may not be "sacred," but such a designation is
irrelevant to our understandings of identity. Hence, "identity" may
be a sight for a less hierarchical and more fluid and humane
conception of the legal management of genetic information.
Arabian's invocation of the sacred and the profane also recalls
19th century separate spheres ideologies that designated the private
domestic world of the home as "sacred" space, where delicate and
sensitive women engaged in edifying spiritual pursuits while men
entered the rough and tumble of the profane public world of the
market to earn a living and protect their dependent families.69
Similarly, Arabian implicitly feminizes "the human vessel" as
vulnerable to the ravages of the market. Market forces here become
a form of "pollution" when they enter the sacred realm of spirit and
dignity.70  Ironically, his judicial restraint allows for the free
commodification of Moore's body parts by the scientific and medical
communities. Science, it would seem, does not "pollute" in the same
way as do straightforward market forces. The apparently
66. Hyde, supra note 4, at 57.
67. Id. at 73.
68. Id.
69. For discussions of separates spheres ideology, see Frances Olsen, The Family and
the Market; A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) and
Okin, infra note 108. On the nineteenth century origins of the ideology of separate
spheres in America, see generally NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD (1977);
ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1977); and SHEILA
ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE 13-62 (1978).
70. For more on the concept of cultural pollution, see MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND
DANGER (1980).
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"transcendent" values of scientific research somehow purify the
otherwise profane commodification of body parts. Thus, like the
male head of family, science and scientists seem capable of
negotiating between the sacred and profane, mastering both. Arabian
does not trust Moore with decision over whether to commodify his
body parts, but he does trust the experts.71 Arabian effectively
deprives Moore of control over his sacred "human vessel" and hands
it over to scientists and doctors to do with as they will. He thereby
also deprives the community of the power to define and maintain a
space beyond the reach of the market in which social relations
recognize and validate a certain normative conception of individual
dignity.
Arabian's abdication of judicial responsibility in the face of his
admitted concern for "the effect on human dignity of a marketplace
in human body parts"72 points up the ongoing need to sort out the
history of property and identity interests in the jurisprudence of
appropriation. Moore himself was apparently primarily concerned
with the property value of his tissues. But Arabian's denial of that
interest does not begin to address his deeper concern to protect
human dignity from the marketplace. Arabian, perhaps, is able to
reach the odd result of sacrelizing the body while vindicating the
defendants' property claim to it because he is concerned primarily
with "the body" in the abstract as a sacred vessel. A focus on
"identity" would force Arabian to consider the particular
circumstances of a specific individual. If, instead of throwing up his
hands in dismay, Arabian (and the majority) explicitly recognized
that a dignitary interest was at stake, he could then make constructive
use of the jurisprudence of appropriation to address the issue of
whether the commodification of Moore's body parts without his
consent harmed his dignity.
Commenting on the distinction between sale of such renewable
body parts as blood plasma as opposed to one's DNA, Barry
Hoffmaster notes that "[p]erhaps, then, it is not commercialization of
the body per se that infringes dignity, but commercialization of parts,
components, or aspects of the body that are constitutive or reflective
71. In his dissent with respect to the issue of conversion, Justice Broussard takes
Justice Arabian to task for his inconsistency in objecting to the immorality of selling body
parts while embracing a majority decision that permits the defendants "who allegedly
obtained the cells from plaintiff by improper means, to retain and exploit the full
economic value of their ill-gotten gains free of their ordinary common law liability for
conversion." 793 P.2d at 506 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
72. Id. at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring).
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of our uniqueness as human beings." 73 A comparable distinction may
be found in the law of appropriation where the mere use of a person's
image is not actionable per se. Rather, the image must be
recognizable as portraying a particular individual. That is, it must be
seen to contain or embody some aspect of that individual's unique
identity. Similarly, aspects of the body that are considered as
distinctively constitutive of a particular individual might be seen as
embodying some aspect of that individual's unique identity; hence,
the Appellate Court's concern to refute the dissent's argument that
Moore's spleen was "human waste" by asserting the "dignity of the
human cell. '74 Thus, in cases such as Moore's, concerns for
commodification of the body may be refracted through the additional
lens of concerns for commodification of the individual. That is, we
may better understand how and when the law should permit or forbid
the sale of body parts as property if we consider how and to what
extent the individual's identity would be implicated by the
transaction. "Experts" cannot make this decision for us. It can only
be made by judges, juries, or legislatures who choose to interpret the
transaction in light of local understandings of its significance. In this
context, relations between the body and the self are constructed not
by science but by social and historical processes.
In a forceful dissent, Justice Mosk focused on the difference
between not-for-profit scientific use versus commercial for-profit use
of Moore's genetic material. Mosk's market-based distinction
strongly echoes the distinction in the jurisprudence of appropriation
between newsworthy and commercial uses of a person's image. The
former is not seen to debase individuality, whereas the latter, by
rendering the subject into a fungible commodity, harms the individual
by effacing or partializing distinctive aspects of his unique identity.75
Mosk based his argument on a section of the California Health and
Safety Code that permits only "scientific use" of excised body parts.7 6
"It would stretch the English language beyond recognition," he
asserts, "to say that commercial exploitation of the kind and degree
alleged here is also a usual and ordinary meaning of the phrase
'scientific use."' 77  Mosk notes that the majority dismissed his
objections by arguing that the phrase "scientific use" includes for-
73. Barry Hoffmaster, Between the Sacred and the Profane: Bodies, Property, and
Patents in the Moore Case, 7 INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115, 133 (1992).
74. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505-07.
75. See Kahn, supra note 5, at 318-24.
76. See 793 P.2d at 508 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 508.
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profit as well as not-for-profit scientific uses.78 Mosk, however,
rejoined by stating that, "the distinction I draw is not between
nonprofit scientific use and scientific use that happens to lead to a
marketable by-product; it is between a truly scientific use and the
blatant commercial exploitation of Moore's tissue that the present
complaint alleges." Under that complaint, Mosk asserted, the
defendant doctors were not only scientists but also "full-fledged
entrepreneurs. " 79
Mosk, then, was not bothered by the fact that scientific use of
human tissue may eventually lead to profit. Rather, he was
concerned with "commercial exploitation." The analogy to
newsworthy (as opposed to commercial) uses of a person's identity
grows strong here. Thus, for example, the mere fact that one sells a
newspaper for a profit does not necessarily mean that the use of an
individual's name or image therein constitutes a commercial
exploitation of her identity. But where, as in Clint Eastwood's suit
against the National Enquirer, the form of publication in a newspaper
merely masks a more direct and immediate commercial exploitation
of the subject's identity, a cause of action for appropriation may
exist.8 0
Mosk also configured the boundaries between public and private
differently from the majority. The majority saw science as capable of
negotiating between the market and the private sphere of individual
autonomy without ill-effects. Mosk, however, casts science outside of
and perhaps even in opposition to the market. There is a distinct
sense that Mosk sees as profane commercial motives as "polluting"
the more sacred ideals of "pure" science. Even if it does not wholly
belong to the private sphere, science, for Mosk, nonetheless does not
exist in the market. Perhaps Mosk was imputing to science a quasi-
public status, like government: an enterprise to be disinterestedly
pursued for the common good. In any event, Mosk clearly was trying
to establish a boundary between science and commerce, much as the
jurisprudence on privacy does between news and commerce.
Yet Mosk has difficulty getting away from a property-based
conception of Moore's rights. At one point, he suggests that Moore
be considered a "joint inventor" of the cell line with an equal claim to
benefit from its commercial exploitation.81 Although a reasonable
argument (which partially addresses James Boyle's concerns that the
78. See id. at 492 n.34, 508.
79. I& at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
80. Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
81. See 793 P.2d at 513.
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majority opinion effectively reduces Moore to a mere source of raw
materials), it nevertheless fails to take account of the dignitary harm
alluded to by the lower court in its analogy to the appropriation cases.
Mosk even went so far as to endorse Justice Broussard's assertion
that "'the question of uniqueness has no proper bearing on plaintiff's
basic right to maintain a conversion action; ordinary property, as well
as unique property is, of course, protected against conversion."' 82 It is
important to note, however, that Mosk and Broussard here were
referring to the uniqueness of Moore's cells as defined by science.
They were not addressing directly the issue of the impact of their
appropriation upon the uniqueness of Moore's identity as defined by
the community or polity.
A more explicit articulation and direct use of privacy
jurisprudence in this area might provide an alternative set of
regulative principles to clarify and strengthen arguments regarding
the proper management of genetic information. Specifically, the tort
of appropriation recognizes a special harm in the commodification of
identity. In its turn-of-the-century origins, the tort meant to reaffirm
a set of values regulating social relations beyond the reach of the
market. Subjecting a person's identity to market forces threatened to
render it a mere fungible commodity, or at any rate commensurable
with other objects in a cash nexus. Such subjection, particularly
without consent, could efface or otherwise degrade the integrity of
the person's distinct individuality. It affronted both the dignity of the
individual and the integrity of the community seeking to enable a set
of normative values that validated dignitary interests.8 3
C. The Self Beyond the Body: From Individual to Group Identity
Returning to the Appellate Court's decision, we find the tort of
appropriation is at the heart of its finding regarding Moore's claim of
conversion. Among the most suggestive appropriation cases alluded
to by the Appellate Court are those involving Bette Midler and
Lothar Motschenbacher. In the 1980s, Bette Midler, a popular singer
with a highly distinctive vocal style, had been approached by an
advertising agency to perform a song to run with a television
commercial for Ford Motor Company. Midler refused, saying she did
not do commercials. The agency thereupon hired one of Midler's
former backup singers whom they told to sound as much like Midler
as possible. After the commercial ran, a number of people did indeed
82. Id. at 522 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting,
ante, at 503).
83. See Kahn, supra note 5, at 318-24.
July 2000] BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE SELF
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
believe the voice to be Midler's. Midler then brought suit in
California seeking an injunction and damages.84
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Midler stated a
valid cause of action based on the common law tort of appropriation.
Drawing a direct analogy to the appropriation of an individual's
visual image, the court argued that, "[a] voice is as distinctive and
personal as a face.... The singer manifests herself in the song. To
impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity."85 The court focuses
on the way and degree to which an individual becomes bound up with
a representation of herself. Midler was harmed by the sound-alike to
the degree that she had "manifested" herself in the song. In using the
metaphor of piracy, the court evokes images of plunder and looting
that echo Pavesich's allusions to enslavement.
The Midler court here takes a step beyond traditional
appropriation law in recognizing that one's identity may become
bound up with something other than one's name or visual image. In
basing the cause of action on this relationship, the court uses the law
to recognize and construct a conception of identity as both worthy of
legal protection and as capable of being projected beyond the
boundary of the corporeal body or its visual representation into such
intangible and "unfixed" a thing as the sound of one's voice.
Beyond the use of names and images which directly invoke a
person's identity, courts have also found that the commercial
exploitation of certain objects or phrases that are closely identified in
the public mind with a particular individual may amount to an actual
appropriation of identity. In the 1974 case of Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the use in an advertisement of a famous driver's distinctive race car
may give rise to a cause of action for appropriation of identity.86 The
court noted that the plaintiff Motschenbacher had "consistently
'individualized' his cars [with special markings] to set them apart."
The advertisement showed the car on a racetrack in the foreground in
front of other race cars. Motschenbacher was in the car but his
features were not recognizable. The advertisement showed a word
balloon coming from the plaintiff's car which said "Did you know that
Winston tastes good, like a cigarette should?" The plaintiff
established that many people immediately recognized his car. A
lower court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the plaintiff
84. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 463.
86. See 498 F.2d 821, 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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himself was not identifiable in the advertisement.87
The Circuit Court reversed, holding that even though the
plaintiff himself was not recognizable, the portrayal of his distinctive
car clearly implied that it had a driver who was in fact the plaintiff.
By implying Motschenbacher's presence through his car, the
defendant may have appropriated his identity.88 That is, an object, in
this case a car, had become so identified with a particular individual
that its use served to invoke his identity just as the use of a
recognizable image of his face would.
Unlike the cases involving imitation or look-alikes,
Motschenbacher's car did not "look like" him. There was no question
of the car itself being mistaken for Motschenbacher. Rather, the
court moved beyond first hand representation of the individual to
consider the ways in which distinctive objects may embody a person's
identity. The question of recognition was thereby shifted from the
individual to the object. Motschenbacher need not be recognizable if
his car is. The car becomes a surrogate for its owner.
The court here extended legal recognition of identity beyond its
manifestation in direct representations of the individual to objects
which "stand for" or symbolize the individual.89 To a certain degree
this is simply the logical extension of legal recognition of the identity
interest in a name which is a similarly abstract symbol of an
individual. Names, however, have a long history being accepted as
legal symbols of an individual.90 As a practical matter, therefore, the
court's action opens up significant new territory by moving beyond
87. Id.
88. See id. at 824-25. In contrast, in the 1954 case of Branson v. Fawcett Publication,
124 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Ill. 1954), the court found no invasion of privacy where a picture of
a racing car accident published in a magazine to illustrate a fictional story that made no
reference to the plaintiff. Even though some of the plaintiff's friends recognized the car as
his, the court noted that "no identifying marks or numbers on the car appear. It is just
another speed automobile," and concluded by stating that, "[w]hen considered by itself
[the picture] in no way relates to or identifies any particular driver." Id. at 432. The court
construed the image itself to be fungible, "just another speed automobile;" its generic
quality apparently precluded it from embodying any particular identity characteristics. In
the court's eyes, the lack of identifying marks meant, in effect, that the plaintiff was not
"present" in the picture and hence could not be harmed by its use. See id. The mere
association of this picture with the plaintiff by a few of his friends was not sufficient to
place him in the picture. Perhaps had a larger social circle recognized the image the court
would have found appropriation, as a court later did in Motschenbacher.
89. For a discussion of symbolic representation and the phenomenon of one thing
"standing for" another, see HANNAH PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91
(1967).
90. See ANTHONY COHEN, SELF CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ALTERNATIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF IDENTITY 72 (1994).
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the long-accepted categories of name and image to find that almost
any object may potentially gain legal recognition as an embodiment
of an individual's identity.
The Appellate Court in Moore made a potentially radical finding
by using the analogy to cases such as Midler and Motschenbacher to
grant legal recognition to DNA as a constitutive aspect of Moore's
self. In the traditional jurisprudence of appropriation, one's name
and image are protected insofar as they manifest aspects of one's
identity-that is, insofar as they act as projections or manifestations
of one's self beyond the body. In Moore, however, the court asserted
that an individual should have a legal claim to his genetic material
because,
[p]laintiff's cells and genes are a part of his person. Putting aside
the effect of environment, "[a]n individual's genotype contains all
of the genetic instructions essential for human development,
growth, and reproduction.... [paragraph sign] All human traits,
including weight, strength, height, sex, skin color, hair texture,
fingerprint pattern, blood type, intelligence and aspects of
personality (for example, temperament), are ultimately determined
by the information encoded in the DNA." (Gordon Edlin, Genetic
Principles-Human and Social Consequences (1984) pp. 406-407.)
If the courts have found a sufficient proprietary interest in one's
persona, how could one not have a right in one's own genetic
material, something far more profoundly the essence of one's
human uniqueness than a name or a face? 91
This passage is both extraordinary in the possibilities it raises for
the legal recognition of identity and all too typical in its blurring of
the dignitary and proprietary interests implicated by the
appropriation of a person's identity. Nonetheless, it clearly finds that
Moore's DNA deserves legal consideration under the domain of
appropriation law because it somehow constitutes his "human
uniqueness." 92
Granting legal recognition to the constitutive elements of
identity is a logical corollary of recognizing its outward manifestations
in names or images. Indeed, projections of one's identity serve in
turn to reconstitute and maintain it as it grows and evolves. The
jurisprudence of appropriation does not construct identity as a static,
fixed object but rather as an organic, complex and evolving
manifestation of the self that changes over time and across context.93
91. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
92. Id.
93. A nice example of this may be seen in the case of Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610
F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In 1985, Woody Allen, the well-known comedian, actor,
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Protecting projections of identity, therefore, also involves protecting
the ongoing constitution of the self. The Appellate Court in Moore
simply made this relationship more explicit. By focusing on DNA,
the court emphasized the value of relations and objects that constitute
and movie director, brought suit under New York's privacy statute and the Lanham Act to
enjoin the dissemination of an advertisement for a video store that showed a celebrity
look-alike portraying Allen. The court ultimately resolved the claim by finding that the
advertisement violated the Lanham Act by using a representation which might confuse or
mislead consumers. Nonetheless, it also considered at length Allen's privacy-based
appropriation claim and reflected upon its legal implications.
The court began with a discussion of whether the advertisement qualified as a
"recognizable likeness" of the plaintiff. Id at 623. It found the status of a look-alike to be
far more problematic in this regard than a mere photograph or artistic representation.
The issue for the court was not whether the look-alike would "remind" people of Allen
but whether "most persons who could identify an actual photograph of the plaintiff would
be likely to think that this was actually his picture." Id. at 624. In this case, however, the
look-alike portrayed an earlier "version" of Allen, a past identity which was no longer
consonant with his present self. As the court put it,
the hair style and expression [of the look-alike], while characteristic of the
endearing "schlemiel" embodied by plaintiff in his earlier comic works, are
out of step with plaintiffs post-"Annie Hall" appearance and the serious
image and somber mien that he has projected in recent years.
Id. at 624. The court found this relevant primarily as it bore on whether an observer
would think the image actually was Allen. If so, a claim of appropriation might be
warranted. The court found that the advertisement did make a reference to Allen but it
would hesitate "to conclude that the photograph is, as a matter of law, plaintiff's portrait
or picture." Id.
Consider first, that if the court were concerned only with the property-based aspects
of the celebrity image, then all representations of Allen, regardless of the stage of his life
portrayed, would presumably be his property. But because the court was concerned with
the privacy-based dignitary aspects of appropriation of identity it had to consider whether
this particular image was invested with aspects of Allen's current identity. That is, the
court was concerned with which of Allen's personae had been appropriated. If the
"schlemiel" persona of the past were sufficiently divorced in the public mind from Allen's
current more serious persona then there would be no appropriation.
In the law of appropriation, therefore, identity is not fixed and bounded. It shifts and
evolves according to time and context. The use of the "schlemiel" persona before Allen
had appeared in "Annie Hall" might constitute an appropriation, whereas the use of the
exact same image some years later might not. The court recognized that Allen's identity
had developed over time. He was literally (and legally) not the same person he once was.
To the extent that he retained aspects of the identity embodied by the "schlemiel" image
he might be able to bring a claim of appropriation. But the court indicated that his newer
identity was currently more salient. It established this in large part by reference to the
public perception and understanding of Allen as having left the "schlemiel" behind to
become a more serious film maker. Allen's present persona, therefore, would not likely
be harmed by the advertisement. The advertisement's image of a past self might enslave a
past identity but the identity of Allen as constituted in the current plaintiff before the
court was not captured by the look-alike. Hence the court's hesitation to find an
appropriation of Allen's identity. See id at 624.
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the self. The issue for the court, then, was what sort of legal interest
Moore had in a constitutive aspect of his self (in this case, genetic
material) after (or when) that aspect came to exist beyond the
boundaries of his corporeal body. It resolved the question by
asserting that Moore had a privacy-based dignitary interest in
maintaining control over what happened to his tissues.94
The potentially powerful implications of this holding become
evident when we return to an offhand phrase at the beginning of the
passage quoted at length above: "Putting aside the effect of
environment." The court may put environment aside, but it does not
dismiss it. Rather, it implies that environmental factors may
constitute identity just as DNA does. I would like to consider what
might happen if we bring environment back "inside" the discussion.
If, as the court asserts, the law should recognize a legal interest in
genetic materials insofar as they constitute the "essence of one's
human uniqueness," then should it not also recognize environmental
factors -history, culture, and society-through which the substance of
individual identity is constituted and maintained? The implications of
such legal recognition are both promising and problematic: promising
because they open up new approaches to the legal status of group
rights and to redressing harms caused by stigmatizing individuals
based on affiliations that constitute aspects of their identity;
problematic because such affiliations are potentially boundless and
require some substantive standards of recognition in order to offer
manageable and legally coherent guidelines to be applied.
In her work on "Property and Personhood," Margaret Radin
asserts that "to achieve proper self-development- to be a person -an
individual needs some control over resources in the external
environment." 95 She goes on to make a critical distinction between
fungible and non-fungible types of property, control of the latter
being critical to "proper self-development. ' 96 All objects, Radin
argues, contain both fungible and non-fungible attributes. They may,
in fact, be considered as existing along a continuum between
complete fungibility and non-fungibility-a continuum Radin
characterizes as involving "property and personhood. '97  Non-
fungible attributes are those grounded in the personhood or identity
of the owner. That is, they are a source of value distinctive to the
owner and derived from identity-based associations rather than from
94. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
95. Margret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 957 (1982).
96. See id. at 959-60.
97. Id.
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material use or exchange value. "Most people," Radin notes,
"possess certain objects they feel are almost a part of themselves.
These objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are
part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities
in the world." 98 Objects possessing mostly fungible attributes, in
contrast, do not become bound up with the self but rather are
"perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value." 99
Radin illustrates her point with the example of a wedding ring: if
stolen from a jeweler it can be replaced with insurance proceeds, but
if stolen from its "loving wearer" perhaps no amount of money can
restore the status quo.1' °
Looking to Radin's notion of a continuum of "property for
personhood" we may argue that the greater the degree to which a
person is invested in or bound up with an historical, social, or cultural
association the more the law should recognize a legal interest in
protecting the integrity of that relationship. That is, just as DNA may
be seen to constitute an important aspect of our tangible physical
identity, so too may affiliations of family, race, gender, ethnicity,
religion and so forth be recognized as constituting important aspects
of our intangible social, cultural, and historical identity. Each may
deserve a measure of legal recognition as "profoundly the essence of
one's human uniqueness."
The nature and degree of legal recognition may vary according
the nature and degree of the affiliation at stake. At one end of the
continuum, it may entail simple procedural recognition of a right to
participate in notice and comment hearings, as with local decisions
affecting the zoning of a long-standing ethnic neighborhood that may
play a role in constituting its inhabitants identities. At the other end,
it may involve invoking the full force of the law to dismantle a
political and legal regime that demeans and undermines the integrity
of individual's identity based on her affiliation with a particular group
with which they are intimately bound up-as for example, the Jim
Crow South.
A focus on identity-constitutive relationships shifts the question
of the legal status of groups from one of "group rights" to one of
"individual rights through groups." That is, under this approach
groups become legally relevant to the extent that individuals obtain,
maintain, and retain significant constitutive aspects of their identity
through their affiliation with a particular group. Indeed, courts
98. Id. at 959.
99. Id. at 960
100. Id.
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already recognize a legal value for identity-constitutive relationships
that may be understood as establishing "rights through groups"-but
they do so implicitly or indirectly. Thus, we may recharacterize an
array of established rights as being secured largely through group
affiliation. At the most basic level, an individual obtains certain rights
through affiliation with the group "persons." That we generally do
not conceive of "persons" as an identity-constitutive group is merely
testament to the degree to which we view this classification as so
"natural" or "given" as to render it unproblematic and hence largely
unmarked. Yet, it was precisely the problem of defining the
boundaries of what constituted a "person" that lay at the heart of
Justice Blackmun's rather tortured resolution of legal status of the
fetus in Roe v. Wade.1 1 Less controversially, the law constructs
persons when it grants corporate charters or recognizes de facto
corporations. Going back at least to the 1886 case of Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,02 we see that significant rights
have been accorded to corporations largely by reason of theirjudicially defined affiliation with the group "persons."'103
A somewhat more circumscribed group is legally defined by the
term "citizens." The contours and boundaries of this group, like that
of the group "persons," are far more problematic than appear on first
impression. As Judith Shklar notes of the American context, "[w]hat
renders any group or individual unfit for citizenship is economic
dependence, race, and gender, which are all socially created or
hereditary conditions."'1 4 Thus, for example, the infamous case of
Dred Scott v. Sandford'0 5 turned largely on the question of whether
African Americans, slave or free, could belong to the group "citizens"
of the United States.' 6 The Court denied such an affiliation based
primarily on its understanding of historical and social constructions of
the identity of African Americans as being "unfit" for taking on the
attributes such an affiliation would confer.107 (Indeed, one might also
argue that the Court's analysis of the status of African Americans
also excluded them from full membership in the group "persons.")
The legally-sanctioned oppression of women similarly bespeaks a
systematic limitation or restriction of state recognition of women's
claim to take on the full attributes of "citizen." Most glaringly, the
101. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
102. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
103. See id.
104. JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 8 (1991)
105. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 407.
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denial of suffrage withheld from women the right or power to
conceive of themselves as full citizens-it denied them a full civic
identity. Additionally, the legal concept of coverture subsumed a
woman's civic identity under that of her husband's -again, as with
African Americans, even to the point of excluding her from full
membership in the larger group of "persons.' 10 8 The history of
immigration and naturalization is also replete with examples of
tortured legal constructions of who may and who may not qualify as a
"citizen" of the United States. 10 9
Similar arguments may be made with respect to categories such
as race. Race, too, is not a "natural" category, and its legal
significance in particular is socially and historically constructed." 0
The legal boundaries of particular racial groups are continually
shifting in practice, whether through individual acts such as
''passing," or through contemporary political debates and struggles
over census categories, including the new "multi-racial" group. In the
realm of equal protection, Brown v. Board of Education,"' with its
focus on racial stigma, may be viewed as deeply concerned with
dismantling a regime of state-sanctioned denigration of the identity of
a group of individuals based on their affiliation with a particular race.
Invoking the words of the Moore court, we might say that racial
segregation implicated something "profoundly the essence of one's
human uniqueness" and hence constituted "a massive invasion of
privacy and dignity.""12 In this context, "uniqueness" would be
conceived of not as some essential timeless core of individuality
(certainly not in any "genetic" sense), but as a socially and historically
recognized characteristic through which many individuals constituted
deeply significant aspects of their identity. In this regard, concepts
from the jurisprudence of appropriation may be used to elaborate the
work of scholars such as Charles Lawrence, who analyze Brown as a
case about regulating hate speech, that is, about the message
segregation sends that stigmatizes blacks." 3
108. See, e.g., JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE, passim (1991); SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 26-33 (1989).
109. See e.g., IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (1996).
110. See, e.g., id.; MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (1994).
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
113. Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Hate Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 133
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Moving to a still more circumscribed level of legally recognized
identity-constitutive groups we may consider how the United States
Supreme Court has recognized, through substantive due process
analysis, the legal value of the integrity of the group "family," in large
measure because of its role in raising children-or, one might say,
forging their identities.114 Thus, Justice Powell, in his plurality
opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, spoke of how the Court's
"decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family, precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and traditions. It is through the family that we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural."11 5 Powell goes on to elaborate a definition of "family"
that, while rooted in biology, is also profoundly social and historical:
"Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally
deserving of constitutional recognition." 116
This is not to say that all groups, being "socially constructed" are
of equal political or legal significance as constitutive of individual
identity. In his majority opinion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,117
Justice Brennan provides a good starting point for sorting through
and evaluating the importance of diverse group affiliations. In this
case, the Court found that the application of state law to compel the
Jaycees to accept women as regular members did not violate their
First Amendment right of association. Brennan found that the basis
of associational rights lay in a group's relation to sustaining and
developing the identity of individual members:
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie
this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that certain
kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture
and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared
ideals and beliefs .... Moreover, the constitutional shelter
afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with
others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state
interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to
(1982); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
114. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
115. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 504.
116. Id.
117. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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define one's identity that is central to the concept of liberty." 8
Following Brennan's recognition of that certain group affiliations
are more central to identity than others, we may conceive of varying
degrees of legal recognition of and solicitude for such affiliations.
The more central to individual identity, as recognized through social
and historical practice, the greater the legal consideration of identity-
constitutive affiliations. We may conceive of this scheme as being
ordered along "spheres of identity" (to paraphrase Michael
Walzer).l' 9 We are, all of us, enmeshed in multiple webs of
associations through which we constitute our sense of self. Some of
those associations are more important than others. Groups such as
"person," "citizen," "African American," "family," or "woman" each
have distinctive traditions of legal recognition. Other groups, such as
those based on class or sexual orientation, have much more limited
but evolving histories of legal consideration. Still others-clubs such
as the Jaycees, for example-have received very limited legal
recognition based on the perception that they do not play a significant
role in maintaining an individual's ability to "define one's identity."
The case of Moore and its attention to the tort of appropriation
of identity provides a basis for making legal recognition of identity-
constitutive relationships more explicit and more directly accountable
as the open manifestation of conscious substantive commitments to
particular group affiliations that are recognized as playing a
significant role in constituting and maintaining individual identity.
This approach might establish a sort of continuum of legal recognition
based on the intensity or centrality of the relevant affiliation.
In Thurgood Marshall's opinions we see an existing approach to
equal protection that might provide a model for such an identity-
based continuum of legal recognition. Thus, for example, in his
dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,120
Marshall writes that,
[a] principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum
clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the
Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe,
on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn. I find in fact that
many of the Court's recent decisions embody the very sort of
118. Id. at 618-619 (citations omitted).
119. MICHAELWALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
120. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I
previously argued-that is, an approach in which "concentration
[is] placed upon the character of the classification in question, the
relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against
of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification."'121
Marshall's "spectrum" takes into consideration the types of
variable social, historical, and political circumstances that lower
courts have applied for nearly a century in privacy cases involving the
construction and maintenance of individual identity. This is
especially so in his reference to the "recognized invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn." The concept
of "recognized invidiousness" brings us back to historically and
socially established considerations of stigma and identity. Marshall,
however, was unable to move the court away from a rigid "two
tiered" approach to scrutiny under equal protection. Perhaps, this
was due in part to the fact that the discourse of equality is not easily
susceptible to a "sliding scale. 122 Something either is or is not equal
to something else. The principles of privacy-based consideration for
the interests of identity as articulated in the jurisprudence of
appropriation may, however, be used to inform or supplement
Marshall's approach to elaborate a more coherent and forceful
approach to the legal management of state action that implicates the
interests and rights of groups.
Appropriation presents an established legal tradition that allows
us to specify and articulate more clearly the nature of the legal
interests and harm involved when identity-constitutive relations are
implicated by a case. Stigma, as Erving Goffman so influentially
stated, involves the "management of spoiled identity."'123 To engage
issues of stigma in the legal arena, therefore, we must first elaborate
what the law considers to be "identity." The jurisprudence of
appropriation provides perhaps the most explicit site for the
exploration of this issue. It is hardly the only place where law
recognizes and manages identity; but being so explicit, it is an
excellent starting point. We can see, however, that this approach to
the harm of racial stigma is not grounded in the equal protection
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment but in the jurisprudence of
121. Id. at 98-99 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970)
(dissenting opinion)).
122. For a discussion, and endorsement of Marshall's approach, see Ronald Dworkin, Is
Affirmative Action Doomed?, N.Y. REv. BOOKs, Nov. 5, 1998, at 57.
123. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED
IDENTITY (1963).
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privacy and the appropriation of identity. Harm, in that sense, is not
identified by comparing the treatment of some particular group to a
particular other group (most typically the unstated norm of the adult,
straight, white, native-born, protestant male). 2 4 Rather, it involves a
commitment to certain substantive norms regarding the proper
recognition and treatment of particular groups and their members in
society. In cases involving state action, this would effectively involve
using substantive due process analysis as an alternative or
complement to equal protection. Such a substantive approach forces
hard choices and may become the site of fierce contestations, but it
may be applied to a potentially wide variety of groups and affiliations.
These consideration all go to the question, "which group
affiliations matter and who says so?" There is no easy answer, but
this does not mean that the principle of recognizing the legal
significance of identity-constitutive affiliations is wholly unworkable.
We may continue to engage the issue by paraphrasing Marshall-by
considering "the character of the [group] in question, the relative
importance to individuals of [their affiliation with the group] ... and
the asserted state interests in support of the classification [affecting
the group]."'2 Marshall's formulation may then be further fleshed
out by looking back to appropriation cases ranging from Pavesich's to
those of Midler and Motschenbacher. In these cases we see the courts
willing to engage in an ongoing process of assessing and evaluating
the relationship between individuals and a wide variety of names and
images that are said to somehow contain a part of themselves. The
courts have had no bright line rules to guide them in these cases, but
they have managed all the same to deal with this intangible thing they
call "identity." Just as all groups do not play an equally significant
role in constituting individuals' identities, the mere claim by an
individual to be "bound up" with a particular name or image does not
guarantee legal recognition under the tort of appropriation.
Nonetheless, the subjective viewpoint and narrative experience of the
individual is respected and essential to these cases. The courts have
also evaluated claims of appropriation in their local social and
historical context. An image is not found to "embody" aspects of the
plaintiff's identity unless there is some broader social recognition of
the validity to the plaintiff's claim. Identity is not constructed solely
by the individual but through interaction with history and society.
Similarly, manifestations of individual identity also require a broader
consideration of historical and social recognition that a particular
124. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIED 32-45 (1987).
125. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 98-99.
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name or image might indeed manifest aspects of the individual's
identity.
We may argue that similar considerations could and should apply
when examining a claimed relationship between an individual and an
identity-constitutive affiliation. Scholars such as Owen Fiss, Kenneth
Karst and Aviram Soifer have already developed eloquent and
forceful arguments for granting legal recognition to socially, culturally
and historically significant groups. 2 6 Their work, however, tends to
focus on the First Amendment right of association and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This focus, of
course, is logical, and quite suggestive. I would argue that such
analyses might be fruitfully elaborated and extended by incorporating
the principles and practices articulated by the courts through the now
well-established jurisprudence of appropriation of identity.
If we take the jurisprudence of appropriation seriously as an
articulation of certain legally cognizable identity-based dignitary
interests that may be manifest in various representations of the self,
then we must reconceive the nature and status of the liberal rights-
bearing individual within existing legal doctrine. The law of
appropriation demonstrates that there is a long established but largely
overlooked tradition in American jurisprudence that blurs and
enlarges the boundaries of the self beyond the "natural" body (itself a
social construct) to images and symbols that come to embody aspects
of the self through social practices of identification, recognition, and
acceptance.
From Paolo Pavesich's case in 1905, to recent cases such as
Midler's and Motschenbacher's, we see American courts continuously
and explicitly grappling with the legal status of identity. In the course
of their opinions, the courts have recognized that a rights-bearing
individual can be harmed by the commercial use of names or images
(or nicknames, sounds, phrases and objects) that somehow capture a
part of his identity. From the trope of enslavement in Pavesich to
that of piracy in Midler, the courts have conceived of such uses as
directly implicating the self. That is, these cases legally recognize and
construct individual identity as something that can become manifest
outside the body. The self remains connected to identity and may
126. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race
and Sexual Orientation, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 263 (1995); KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S
PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE,
GENDER, AND RELIGION (1995); AVIRAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP
(1995).
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therefore be harmed directly by the commercial appropriation of
images and objects that "embody" aspects of one's identity.
What then are some implications of this overlooked but vigorous
area of the law? If the law recognizes a connection between the self
and manifestations of one's identity beyond the corporeal body, what
other identity-based interests might it also legitimately recognize
under the same or similar legal principles? In the realm of state
action, one logical and significant starting point is the law of
affirmative action. The recent and growing backlash against
affirmative action programs is grounded in large part in a rhetoric of
equality. Differential consideration of the needs and background of
women and minorities, for whatever reasons, is cast as contrary to the
basic idea of treating all people "equally."127 Hence, we have now the
long-standing use of the term "reverse-discrimination"-a term that
only has force in the discursive reaim of equal protection analysis.
Applying an identity-based approach to the problem of
affirmative action, the issue is not whether individuals are being
treated the same or different by virtue of their membership in a
particular group, or whether, more specifically, the use of a particular
racial classification is legitimate. Rather, the issue becomes how and
to what extent such classifications implicate the identity of people
inside or outside the group. We would then ask, does a particular
affirmative action stigmatize or otherwise threaten to undermine the
integrity of the identity of, say black women, or for that matter, the
excluded white men? To evaluate the legitimacy of such a program
we do not turn to social science experts to provide statistical profiles
of relevant labor pools but to the substantive commitments of our
polity to respect the dignity of its citizens. Such a stance reflects the
aspiration toward what Avishai Margalit has termed "The Decent
Society.""-8 A decent society, writes Margalit, "is one that fights
conditions which constitute a justification for its dependents to
consider themselves humiliated. A society is decent if its institutions
do not act in ways that give people under their authority sound
reasons to consider themselves humiliated.' 1 29
More generally, where state action is involved, a concern for the
power of official sanction would lead to a broader conception of the
127. Perhaps most notorious in this regard was the wording of California's recently
adopted Proposition 209, codified as Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 31, which provides that no state
institution may "discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting." (Emphasis added.)
128. AvISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 10-11 (1996).
129. Id.
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words or actions that might threaten or otherwise compromise the
integrity of a group's identity. When a state official pronounces that a
particular group is somehow defective or otherwise inferior, it carries
much more power than when a private individual does so. State
pronouncements implicate fundamental issues of inclusion and
exclusion in the polity that are central to the maintenance of a decent
society and hence merit closer scrutiny.
In the arena of private law, a focus on identity might be
especially useful in sorting out such claims as those of certain
American Indian groups who have found the appropriation of certain
powerful names and images to be deeply offensive to tribal integrity.
Naming practices are particularly salient here; whether in the
continued use by professional sports organizations of such
appellations as "Washington Redskins," or in the recent case of the
descendants of the Sioux Tasunke Witko, known in English as Crazy
Horse, who sued Hornell Brewing Company to enjoin it from using
Crazy Horse's name to market liquor-a particular scourge in Indian
people. 130 The law of appropriation gets beyond the issue of who has
a right to "control" these names or images. It asks, rather, what is the
effect of their use upon the identity of the relevant group and its
members?
When non-state actors are involved we must be especially
concerned that tort actions not be permitted to undermine the vitality
of the First Amendment protections for free speech. The
jurisprudence of appropriation also provides guidance here.
Specifically, since the case of Paolo Pavesich, the tort of
appropriation has been especially concerned to protect an individual's
identity from forced commodification in the market.13' Later cases,
such as Flores v. Mosler Safe Co.,132 speak of the "right of an
individual to be immune from commercial exploitation.' 33 Still more
recently, the 1984 case of Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc,'3
articulates the legal principle under New York law that "all persons
... are to be secured against rapacious commercial exploitation
130. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal
Court Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1996); Nell Jessup Newton,
Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003
(1995).
131. See Kahn, supra note 5, at 318-24.
132. 164 N.E. 853 (N.Y. 1959).
133. Id. at 855. This case involved the interpretation of a New York statute establishing
a right to privacy, passed in the aftermath of the Roberson case in 1903. Although
statutory, the right is modeled on the common law of privacy.
134. 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
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.... [This law] is intended to protect the essence of the person, his or
her identity or persona from being unwillingly or unknowingly
misappropriated for the profit of another.1 35 Newsworthy or artistic
uses of names or images, or even casual gossip, by definition do not
introduce identity into the realm of the market and hence do not
produce the special harms caused by commodification.
Similarly, in daily conversation, a person may invoke another's
name or image without undermining the integrity of their identity.
Thus, a personal epithet or even a political tract that criticizes a
particular group may be insulting but not threaten identity. When,
however, a person introduces another's name or image into the
market-for example, to help sell a product or even as a product
itself-then the larger power of the market is brought to bear upon
the affected individual. The resulting commodification of identity
may be seen to seriously threaten the integrity of individual identity,
precisely because the nature of the market is to render objects
fungible or commensurable with other objects (most notably money)
and thereby deny or efface their distinctive individuality. If we are
truly concerned with protecting individual identity from being
effaced, fragmented, or otherwise degraded then the principles of the
jurisprudence of appropriation may perhaps be fruitfully applied not
only to cases such as Moore's, but also to a myriad of other cases
involving identity-constitutive relationships. In the area of private
law, the substantive privacy-based principles of appropriation may be
used to reconceive such difficult questions as assessing the harms of
hate speech or other actions that aim to degrade a person based on
their affiliation with a group that plays a significant role in
constituting their identity. In public law, the jurisprudence of
appropriation may shed new light on aspects of equal protection law
that are based in stigma. Using such principles we might argue that
classifications based on race, gender or ethnicity are impermissible
where they are used to debase individual identity by degrading groups
that play a significant role in constituting individual identity. Such an
approach avoids the dilemma faced by advocates of affirmative action
who have to base differential treatment on the principles of "equal
protection." Under the rules of appropriation, people do not
necessarily need to be treated "equally," they need to be treated
"decently." Under these principles, affirmative action would cause no
harm to excluded groups (such as white men) so long as the
classification was not meant and did not function to stigmatize them.
We may fear, like the majority in Roberson or the majority in
135. Id. at 260 (also interpreting the New York State privacy statute).
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Moore, that this would lead to a flood of new litigation. But we may
also hope, in the tradition of Warren and Brandeis, that this would
lead to new and creative ways to recognize and protect the dignity of
individuals in a liberal polity as it develops to meet the challenges of
an increasingly complex and interrelated world.
